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 In Plato’s Statesman, the Eleatic Visitor argues that the four apparently distinct arts of politics 
(πολιτική), kingship (βασιλική), slaveholding (δεσποτική), and household-management (οἰκονοµική) are 
in fact one and the same art.  Aristotle rejects this thesis in the second sentence of his Politics 1
(1252a7-18), and spends the rest of Book One trying to substantiate the rejection.  Siding with Aristotle, 2
recent commentators have judged Plato’s argument ‘more persuasive than strict’, ‘extremely weak’, or 
even ‘flagrantly invalid’.  I aim to offer a more charitable interpretation of Plato’s argument. After I 3
review the apparent problem in it and consider three inadequate responses, I reconsider Plato’s 
purposes and reconstruct how the argument validly achieves them. My effort will not show that Plato 
was right and Aristotle wrong, but it will save Plato from failure and clarify what is at issue in their 
disagreement.  
 The argument in question comes early in the Statesman. The Visitor and young Socrates seek 
to define the expert citizen or statesman (hereafter, artificially, the ‘politician’). They first place their 
target among the knowers (258b2-6), and then, to begin narrowing their search, they distinguish 
between practical (πρακτική) and theoretical (γνωστική) knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) (258b7-e7). They agree 
that theoretical knowledge, such as arithmetic, is disengaged from action, and dedicated to knowing, 
whereas practical knowledge, such as building, is naturally embedded in action, and brings a body 
into existence. This prompts an obvious question for their inquiry: is the politician a theoretical 
knower or a practical knower?   4
 But the Visitor does not ask the obvious question. Instead, he asks,  
2 T1. 258e8-11 
Πότερον οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλέα καὶ δεσπότην καὶ ἔτ’ οἰκονόµον θήσοµεν ὡς ἓν πάντα ταῦτα 
προσαγορεύοντες, ἢ τοσαύτας τέχνας αὐτὰς εἶναι φῶµεν ὅσαπερ ὀνόµατα ἐρρήθη; 
Shall we set the politician and king and slaveholder and also the household-manager down as 
one thing though we call them all these things [viz., names], or should we say that the arts 
themselves are as many as the names they are called by? 
So now the Visitor and young Socrates have two tasks. First, they need to determine whether ‘politics’, 
‘kingship’, ‘slaveholding’, and ‘household-management’ name four arts or just one. Second, they need 
to determine whether politics is among the theoretical or practical arts. 
  They apparently try to discharge the first task with just three premises. The Visitor states the 
conclusion clearly:  
T2. 259c1-4 
Οὐκοῦν, ὃ νυνδὴ διεσκοπούµεθα, φανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήµη µία περὶ πάντ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα: ταύτην δὲ εἴτε 
βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονοµικήν τις ὀνοµάζει, µηδέν αὐτῷ διαφερώµεθα. 
Thus, with respect to what we were inquiring into just now, it is plain that there is one science 
concerning all these things; whether someone names it kingship or politics or household-
management, let us not disagree with him at all. 
Similarly clear are the second and third premises: 
T3. 259b7-8  
Καὶ µὴν οἰκονόµος γε καὶ δεσπότης ταὐτόν.  
But a household-manager and a slaveholder are the same thing. 
T4. 259b9-11 
Τί δέ; µεγάλης σχῆµα οἰκήσεως ἢ σµικρᾶς αὖ πόλεως ὄγκος µῶν τι πρὸς ἀρχὴν διοίσετον;  
Οὐδέν.  
3Well then, will the apparent character of a large household differ at all from the bulk of small 
city as far as rule is concerned? 
Not at all. 
There is room for quibbling about what exactly the Visitor and young Socrates agree to here, let alone 
whether they should so agree. But in light of the intended conclusion, it seems best to take these 
premises to be that the arts of household-management and slaveholding are the same and the arts of 
household-management and politics are the same. Then, if the first premise identifies the art of 
kingship with one of the others, the Visitor and young Socrates could draw their conclusion that all 
four arts are one and the same.   
 Unfortunately, the passage where the first premise should be does not identify kingship with 
one of the others. Instead, the Visitor and young Socrates say this: 
  T5. 259a1-b6 
εἴ τῴ τις τῶν δηµοσιευόντων ἰατρῶν ἱκανὸς συµβουλεύειν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτός, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαὶον αὐτῷ 
προσαγορεύεσθαι τοὔνοµα τῆς τέχνης ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ᾧ συµβουλεύει;  
Ναί. 
Τί δ’; ὅστις βασιλεύοντι χώρας ἀνδρὶ παραινεῖν δεινὸς ἰδιώτης ὢν αὐτός, ἆρ’ οὐ φήσοµεν ἔχειν αὐτὸν 
τὴν ἐπιστήµην ἣν ἔδει τὸν ἄρχοντα αὐτὸν κεκτῆσθαι; 
Φήσοµεν. 
Ἀλλὰ µὴν ἥ γε ἀληθινοῦ βασιλέως βασιλική; 
Ναί. 
Ταύτην δὲ ὁ κεκτηµένος οὐκ, ἄντε ἄρχων ἄντε ἰδιώτης ὢν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατά γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν 
βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσρηθήσεται; 
Δίκαιον γοῦν. 
4If someone who is himself private is able to advise one of the public doctors, mustn’t the same 
name of the art be applied to him as to the one he advises?  5
Yes. 
Well, shall we not say that the one who is clever at helping the king of a country, though he is 
himself a private individual, has the knowledge which the ruler needed to have? 
We shall say that. 
But the knowledge that belongs to the true king is kingship? 
Yes. 
And the person who possesses this, whether he happens to rule or to be a private citizen, will 
be addressed with perfect correctness as an expert in kingship, on account of the art itself? 
That is just. 
In other words, just as whether one holds the office of public doctor is irrelevant to whether one has 
the public doctor’s art, so too, whether one is actually a king is irrelevant to whether one has the art of 
kingship.  
 This is plainly not enough to deliver the conclusion of the argument. If we read very 
charitably, we have the following premises and conclusion: 
(P1) One can possess the art of kingship without being a king. 
(P2) The art of household-management = the art of slaveholding. 
(P3) The art of household-management = the art of politics. 
(C) The art of household-management = the art of slaveholding = the art of politics = the art of 
kingship. 
As Cooper says, ‘It flies in your face that the conclusion does not follow (and never mind whether all 
or any of the premises are true)’.  6
5 Recent scholarship offers two ways of covering up this embarrassment. Cooper himself argues 
that Plato intentionally gives us a ‘flagrantly invalid’ argument ‘to place and hold a question mark over’ 
the claim that politics and kingship are the same art.  On his view, the identity of expert politics and 7
expert kingship is the central thesis, and ‘the other two alleged equivalents are brought in solely… as 
camouflage’.  Cooper explains, ‘To any Greek reader the supposition that what a king needs to know is 8
precisely the same thing that a statesman does—a politikos, one who knows how to rule in a polis, a 
free, self-ruling community—must have been, to put it mildly, a great provocation’.  The flagrantly 9
invalid argument helps us to place a question-mark over this identification, and thus prepares us for 
the rest of the dialogue, in which, or so Cooper argues, Plato first over-inflates the expert statesman 
into a king and then deflates a king into an expert statesman. So, as Cooper explains, ‘the initial 
identification of the expert statesman and king really paves the way for a reduction of kingship to 
statesmanship—not the other way around, as first appears’.  10
 I doubt that our argument is supposed to be ‘flagrantly invalid’. First, Cooper’s Plato seems a 
bit confused. This author advances a ‘great provocation’ and yet also designs an invalid argument so 
that readers will question the great provocation. But is the invalidity really necessary? I would have 
thought that great provocations bring their own question-marks. Also, Cooper’s Plato offers a 
flagrantly invalid argument so that his readers question its central conclusion, and yet he also takes 
care to camouflage the central conclusion. But if one were designing a flagrantly invalid argument to 
make a point, why would one want to add camouflage? I would have thought that the flagrant do not 
hide.  What is more, Cooper’s Plato wants to provoke great skepticism about the identification of the 11
political and the kingly arts though he ultimately means to defend the identity. I understand why he 
would want to raise questions about one way of understanding the identification, but what does he 
gain by making the very idea seem like a non-starter? I would have thought that Plato would not want 
to stack the deck against himself.  
6 But these concerns do not unearth the roots of my disagreement with Cooper. My second 
general reason for rejecting Cooper’s interpretation is that he has misdiagnosed the real challenge of 
the argument. Cooper thinks the provocation is to identify expert kingship and expert politics. That 
strikes me as the easy part. The hard part is to identify the public arts of kingship and politics, on the 
one hand, with the private arts of household-management and slaveholding, on the other.  
 Cooper is of course right that the Greeks saw an enormous gulf between Athenian politics and 
the Persian king, but the Visitor does not encourage us to think of Athenians and the Great King. 
When members of the Athenian elite talk about kingship, they need not have the Persian king in 
mind. They might instead have the Spartan kings in mind (e.g., Alc. I 120e-124a), or merely some 
possible, ideal kings (e.g., the Republic). Moreover, when they want to refer to the Persian king, they 
can pick him out explicitly as ‘the great king’ (ὁ µέγας βασιλεύς) (e.g., Plato, Lys. 209d6). So we should 
not think that bare talk of a king in the Statesman necessarily calls the Persian king to mind. In fact, 
the Visitor has called our attention away from ordinary Athenians and Persian kings, because he asks 
us to focus on ‘knowers’ or experts. In the Euthydemus, which similarly focuses on knowledge, Socrates 
reports to Crito that he and young Cleinias ‘thought that the politician’s art and the kingly art were the 
same’ (291c4-5), and there is no hint that either Cleinias or Crito found this controversial. Nor should it 
be controversial, at least if we are accepting some Socratic assumptions. Whether there is one political 
ruler or many, the art political rulers should have is wisdom, and it should benefit the ruled. Of course, 
in the Statesman, the conversation is being led not by Socrates but by the Eleatic Visitor, and while we 
might be prepared for an intellectual from Elea to over-unify things, we cannot assume that he has 
Socratic thoughts in mind. Still, Socrates is hovering nearby, and the Visitor and young Socrates have 
quickly agreed to focus not on what actual statesmen or politicians do but on the expert.  12
 What Cooper dismisses as mere ‘camouflage’ is the harder part, of identifying the private with 
the public arts. In the Phaedrus, Socrates proposes that rhetoric is the same art whether it works in 
7public, in the Assembly and lawcourts, or in private (261a7-b5), and Phaedrus expresses surprise. In 
the Statesman, the Visitor might hint that this identification of public and private is more difficult 
when he first raises the question (at T2), since he uses ‘also’ (ἔτι) to emphasize whether household-
management should be joined to the others. In any case, the only premises that the Visitor develops 
concern the possible distinction between private and public arts. Plainly, then, this is the objection 
that he is most concerned to fend off. A wider view begins to explain why, since there is in Greek 
political ideology a strong contrast between those who engage in politics and those who live a private 
or quiet life. The latter are ridiculed as ‘useless’, ‘unmanly’, ‘fools’, and ‘nobodies to their friends’.  13
Plato’s Meno gives voice to this ideology when he identifies the virtue of a man as ‘being able to do the 
business of the city, and by doing this to benefit his friends and harm his enemies’ (M. 71e2-4) and 
then assigns ‘managing the household well’ to the virtue of a woman (M. 71e6-7). Later in the 
Statesman, the Visitor explains how hostility arises in a city between those committed to living the 
‘quiet life’ and those who favor the vigorously engaged life (307d-308b). But the ideological conflict is 
not inevitable. Socrates challenges the ideology when he insists that he, a private citizen who has 
minimized his engagement in politics (Ap. 23b, 31d-32a), is one of few Athenians, if not the only one, 
to try to practice the true political art (Gorg. 521d6-8).  It is similarly provocative to say that those who 14
are expert household-managers and slaveholders have the same knowledge as those who are expert 
kings and statesmen.   15
 So let us consider a second response to the Visitor’s argument. The argument lacks a premise 
identifying the arts of politics and kingship. Two scholars have independently proposed rectifying this 
by moving three lines of text.  In the manuscripts, the lines come at the very end of our passage, just 16
before the Visitor suggests that they make a second division, between two kinds of theoretical 
knowledge. But the movers, and they include the editors of the most recent Oxford Classical Texts 
8edition, propose to place these lines between the first two premises of the argument, (T5) and (T3). 
Here they are: 
T6. 259d4-6 
Τὴν ἄρα πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν εἰς ταὐτὸν ὡς ἓν πάντα ταῦτα 
συνθήσοµεν;   17
Δῆλον. 
So shall we place all these things—the political art, the expert politician, the kingly art, and 
the expert king—into the same thing [viz., category] as one thing?  
Clearly. 
Cooper calls the decision to move these lines ‘a stunning example of editorial hubris and ignorance’.  18
Those are not my words, but I tend to agree. There needs to be outstanding reason to move text 
around: problems had better get solved. Unfortunately, this particular move solves no problem and 
creates a new one. 
 It creates a problem by depriving our passage of its effective conclusion. Recall that the Visitor 
and young Socrates have two tasks. They reach their conclusion for the first task in (T2), agreeing that 
the arts of politics, kingship, household-management, and slaveholding are the same, and then they 
take up the second task by considering whether this single political art is theoretical or practical 
(259c6-d3). To do this, they agree that ‘any king’—that is, anyone with the single political art that can 
be called the kingly art—has power that resides not in his (own) hands but in his mind (259c6-9), and 
so the art of kingship must be theoretical (259c10-d3). This reasoning, even more than the reasoning 
for the first task, treats the agent who possesses the art as nothing but the art itself, embodied. That is 
why inferences can be made from what the artful king does to the nature of kingship (and vice versa).  19
The completion of the second task also sets up the double conclusion that the apparently various 
political arts are all one and the same art and that this one art belongs to the category of theoretical 
9arts. The passage that some scholars want to move—(T6)—states this double conclusion, 
concentrating on just politics and kingship: these arts belong to the same category (they are 
theoretical knowledge) as one art.  If (T6) is moved, there is no clear conclusion to the two tasks the 20
Visitor and young Socrates took up before the Visitor introduces a further division within theoretical 
knowledge.  
 But perhaps the more serious problem with moving (T6) is that it does not help the Visitor’s 
argument. Notice that (T6) offers an inference (ἄρα). In its original location, it is clear how: (T6) 
completes the Visitor’s two tasks by drawing together the two conclusions into one, validly inferring 
the claim p & q from the claims p and q. In its new home, however, what are the grounds in (T5), about 
a private individual having the same knowledge that a public doctor or king needs, for (T6)? Let us 
consider this dilemmatically. Either (T5) gives good grounds for (T6) or it does not. If it does not, then 
moving (T6) hardly helps the Visitor’s cause. Yes, the Visitor now has a premise he needs to infer that 
the arts of politics, kingship, household-management, and slaveholding are the same, but 
unfortunately, he infers that premise invalidly. One invalidity has replaced another. What if, on the 
other hand, (T5) gives good grounds for (T6)? In this case, we do not need to move (T6) at all. If (T5) 
warrants the conclusion that the kingly and political arts are the same, then we can give the Visitor 
this as an implicit premise to get to his desired conclusion.  
 The possibility of an implicit premise offers a third approach to the argument. If we prefer not 
to call the argument flagrantly invalid for dubious gain and prefer not to shuffle the text for no gain, 
then perhaps we should try to extract from (T5) the grounds for an implicit claim that the kingly and 
political arts are the same. This would give the Visitor a valid argument: 
(P1) Politics = kingship (assumed to be implicit in T5) 
(P2) Household-management = slaveholding (T3) 
(P3) Household-management = politics (T4) 
10
Thus, (C) Politics = kingship = household-management = slaveholding. (T2) 
The initial difficulty with this approach is that there is no explicit mention in (T5) of the expert 
politician or the art of politics at all.  But one might think that the implicit identity does not require 21
any explicit mention of the expert politician. The Visitor does ask, ‘Well, shall we not say that the one 
who is clever at helping the king of a country, though he is himself a private individual, has the 
knowledge which the ruler (ἄρχοντα) needed to have?’ (259a6-8) Here, the word ‘ruler’ plainly refers to 
the same person the word ‘king’ refers to, but in other contexts, the same word easily refers to people 
who are not kings but regular politicians, holding office in the city. One might think that the Visitor’s 
word choice reflects the casual identification of the political art with the art of kingship. And if (T5) 
casually assumes that the political art and the art of kingship are the same, (T4) would, too, with the 
use of ‘rule’ (ἀρχὴν, 259b10).    
 There are two problems with this interpretation. First, it renders the argument valid but very 
weak. The first premise is not articulated, and the second is merely articulated. Only the third premise 
gets supported by reasoning (in T4). But if you were inclined to doubt that the arts of politics, 
kingship, house-hold management, and slaveholding were one and the same, you should easily be able 
to continue doubting after learning in (T4) that the largest households and smallest cities were 
similarly sized. Second, there is a lot going on in (T5) beyond any implicit identification of the arts of 
kingship and politics. The central point of (T5) is that someone can possess the art of kingship 
without being a king. A better interpretation of the Visitor’s argument would explain this; it would 
explain what the Visitor says in making the argument and not merely what the Visitor assumes. 
   So I turn now to a fourth approach to the argument. I propose that we start by attending to 
the two points that the Visitor actually develops, in (T5) and (T4). In these passages, the Visitor 
addresses reasons a person might have for distinguishing between the public arts of politics and 
kingship and the private arts of household-management and slavery. You might think, with Meno, that 
11
there is a significant gulf between the manly sphere of the polis and the womanly sphere of the 
household. Or you might think that what politicians and kings do diverges sharply from what 
household managers and slaveholders do. In (T5), the Visitor focuses our attention not on what these 
various agents do but on what they know, and he insists that a person who is a private citizen can 
know what a public doctor or king needs to know. A private citizen cannot do what a public doctor or 
king can do. Nor, one might worry, can they have all the know-how that is embedded in what a public 
doctor or king does. But they can nonetheless know things the public doctor or king needs to know, 
things that could be communicated by an advisor to an advisee before any action. For the public 
doctor or king needs to know what their goals are, and they must know about how, broadly, to achieve 
those goals, quite apart from any particular actions. Moreover, nothing prevents a private citizen from 
acquiring knowledge about how to promote health or how to rule so as to promote the well-being of 
citizens. With this reasoning, the Visitor has not established that an expert household-manager and an 
expert politician share the same expertise. But he has removed two reasons one might have for 
doubting this, both Meno’s about the difference between the manly polis and the womanly household 
and the appeal to divergent actions. Then, with (T4), the Visitor removes a third reason for doubt. You 
might think that the civic arts differ from the household ones because cities are larger than 
households, but this, as the Visitor points out in (T4), is false. 
 On this fourth approach to the argument, the Visitor is primarily exercised to show that the 
public and private arts are the same. He and his interlocutors nowhere doubt that the arts of politics 
and kingship are the same, and they can take this identity for granted in (T5) and especially (T4). In 
(T3), he baldly claims that the arts of household-management and slaveholding are the same. But in 
(T5) and (T4), he does not merely assume or assert. He works to bridge the gap between the pair of 
arts concerned with the business of the polis and the pair concerned with the business of the 
household. Moreover, on this interpretation, the Visitor is primarily intent on bridging this gap by 
12
turning away from particular actions of ruling, on which the four arts differ, and toward some general 
knowledge of how to rule, on which the four arts might agree. This explains why he turns immediately 
from the implicit question of whether the expert statesman is a theoretical or practical knower to the 
explicit question of whether the arts of politics, kingship, slaveholding, and household-management 
are the same (T1).  To answer the question about theoretical and practical knowledge, the Visitor 22
needs to give greater content to his rough distinction between these kinds of knowledge, and to do 
that, the Visitor uses his argument for identity. This argument draws attention to the ‘theoretical’ 
knowledge shared by the political arts, knowledge not about particular actions but about what the 
goals of ruling human beings are and how, generally, to realize those goals. So understood, the Visitor 
is simultaneously preparing for the conclusion that the four arts are one and the conclusion that this 
one art is ‘theoretical’.  
 But this interpretation faces an objection. One might put the four premises I have attributed 
to the Visitor like this: 
(P1) Whether a person is a public official or not is not significant to whether they know what 
an expert public official knows. (T5) 
 (P2) Household-management = slaveholding. (T3) 
(P3) Whether the number of people managed is large or small is not significant to whether 
one has the art of managing people. (T4) 
(P4) Politics = kingship (assumed) 
The problem is that these four premises are still quite far from the conclusion, in (T2), that the two 
private arts of household-management and slaveholding are the same as the two public arts of politics 
and kingship. The argument needs first to leap from (P1) and (P3) to  
(C*) There is no significant difference between a private political art such as household-
management and slaveholding and a public political art such as politics and kingship. 
13
Then, the argument needs to leap again, from (C*), (P2), and (P4) to 
(C) Politics = kingship = household-management = slaveholding. (T2)  
But both of these inferences seem to be problematic.  23
 The second inference is not problematic.  The reasoning from (C*) to (C) moves from ‘there is 24
no significant difference between X and Y’ to ‘X=Y’. This inference needs some premise or inference-
rule according to which if X and Y differ only in insignificant ways, they are identical. This would be 
nonsense on some conceptions of identity. But the Visitor is plainly not saying that the four political 
arts are identical in every particular but only that they are essentially the same. For that, it will do to 
show that there are no essential differences among them. So there should be no difficulty in 
attributing to the Visitor the general premise or inference-rule he needs. 
 The first inference, from (P1) and (P3) to (C*), by contrast, looks like a hasty generalization. 
The Visitor has addressed three possible differences between private and public political arts.  It 25
would be mad to attribute to him the premise that these are the only differences. So if we want the 
Visitor’s argument to manifest textbook deductive validity, we must think him crazy. But this just 
shows the limited utility of deduction and the importance of other models of inferential validity. It is 
true that the Visitor is committed to all the differences between public and political arts being 
insignificant. But he cannot make good on this commitment exhaustively; he can, in his limited time, 
make good on it only for some obvious differences. Whether this suffices to show that (C*) is plausible 
to us depends upon whether we can think of other differences that are significant. Whether, that is, the 
argument succeeds as an argument depends upon what reasons we can adduce for doubting its 
conclusion.  26
 Exactly here Aristotle shoulders the burden to register his disagreement with Plato. He argues 
that it is not the number of persons managed but the kinds of persons managed that matter to the 
distinction between household-management and city-management (Politics I passim). Plato has 
14
conceded that the actions in relation to a slave or child differ from those in relation to fellow-citizens, 
but he insists that the expert rulers of human beings—whether slaves or free, whether in the 
household or in the city—must know what the goal of ruling is and generally how to achieve those 
goals, which includes knowing what is good for human beings. So Plato is insisting that expert rulers 
of human beings, whether in the household or the city, must have the same knowledge of what is good 
for human beings. Aristotle, by contrast, thinks that what is good for a slave, a child, or a woman is not 
exhausted by considerations of what is good for a human being. He thinks that what is good for man, 
what is good for a woman, what is good for a slave, and what is good for a child differ. The Visitor does 
not make any case for his Socratic assumption, and this makes his argument vulnerable to Aristotle’s 
rejoinder.  
 But the Visitor is not exactly undone by this rejoinder. Aristotle’s distinctions are 
uncomfortably close to Meno’s, including his sharp contrast between the manly world of politics and 
the womanly world of the household, and his appeals to the different natures of slaves and women are 
disappointing. The Visitor can agree with Aristotle that children are something different, but this 
difference does not underwrite a distinction between the public arts of ruling and the private ones, 
since nothing is more important to politics than the education of children (308b-309d; cf. Rep. IV 
423d-e).  
 We might find a better way to resist the Visitor’s argument by insisting that the knowledge of 
what ruling’s goals are and how, generally, ruling can achieve those goals is not enough to characterize 
what politics is, because the essence of politics is trapped in its practical particularities.  Later in the 27
Statesman, the Visitor might even seem to support this case against himself. He favors the expert ruler 
who is not constrained by laws (293c5-e6) and who always knows the right time to begin the most 
important things in cities (305c10-d5). Such a person rules to the needs of particulars, and is not 
limited to general, systematic knowledge.   
15
 But this misses what really distinguishes expert politicians or kings from the pretenders to this 
title. What matters here is not knowledge embedded in action, learned by experience. Rather, it is 
wisdom about the goals of ruling.  This is a familiar Platonic lesson, very clear in Socrates’ distinction 28
between the art of politics and Gorgianic rhetoric (Gorg. 464b-466a). At least Socrates tries to do what 
expert politicians would do, to foster well-being in other citizens. Gorgias and his followers ignore 
what is good for human beings, but instead develop a knack to craft pleasing speeches so that they can 
manipulate audiences and satisfy their own desires for power and wealth.  
 Wisdom about the goals of ruling matters even when the Visitor is sharply distinguishing the 
fully expert ruler who rules without constraint from all the pretenders who live in cities without 
perfectly expert rulers (291a-303d). In the midst of this discussion, the Visitor makes a case for the rule 
of law as an achievable second-best between the zenith of expert rule unconstrained by law and the 
nadir of inexpert rule unconstrained by law (297d-300c). He insists that it is disastrous to flout even 
the laws made on the advice of those who please and persuade the masses (300b1-6). But he does not 
deny that there are better and worse cities that lack fully expert rule, or even that there are laws that 
more and less closely imitate expertise (300e-301e). For better laws, we need better advisors, who do 
not merely gratify those they seek to persuade. But these better advisors are better not by their 
practical knowledge of exactly what to do in particular circumstances but by their general knowledge 
about what is good for human beings, and they are better whether they hold political office or are 
private citizens. To find progress in a world without perfectly expert rulers, we need to look for politics 
defined principally by the general knowledge of what benefits human beings, the politics which 
unifies the political arts at the start of the Statesman.    29
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